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ACTOR AND INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS  
IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF MULTI-STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVES 
 
ABSTRACT 
As forms of private self-regulation, multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) have emerged as an 
important empirical phenomenon in global governance processes. At the same time, MSIs are 
also theoretically intriguing because of their inherent double nature. On the one hand, MSIs 
spell out CSR standards that define norms for corporate behavior. On the other hand, MSIs 
are also the result of corporate and stakeholder behavior. We combine the perspectives of 
institutional theory and club theory to conceptualize this double nature of MSIs. Based on a 
stage model that looks at the interplay of actor and institutional dynamics, we generate 
insights into why actors join a voluntary MSI, how the various motivations and intentions of 
the actors influence the standard development, and how these as well as the MSI design are 
subsequently influenced by both external (institutional) and internal (club) dynamics.  
 
Keywords: business self-regulation; global governance; management of diverse 
interests; multi-stakeholder initiatives; political role of the firm; soft law; club theory; 
institutional theory; institutional entrepreneurship 
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INTRODUCTION 
Multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) have emerged as an important building block in new 
governance arrangements responding to pressing, often global sustainability challenges. In the 
absence of traditional state governance, MSIs provide forms of self-regulation where 
governments are either unwilling or incapable of providing adequate regulation at the national 
or global level (Matten & Crane, 2005). Here, companies co-create and voluntarily commit to 
novel CSR standards that compensate for these governance gaps and go beyond local 
governmental regulation so as to address issues that range from conflict diamonds (Kimberley 
Process) to project financing (Equator Principles), from general business principles (United 
Nations Global Compact) to reporting business sustainability performance (Global Reporting 
Initiative), or from sustainable resource management (Marine Stewardship Council, Forest 
Stewardship Council) to transparency standards needed to create accountability in resource-
rich countries (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative). 
MSIs have thus emerged as a phenomenon of highly practical relevance. At the same 
time, they are also intriguing from a theoretical perspective because of their inherent double 
nature. 
On the one hand, MSIs spell out CSR standards that define norms for corporate 
behavior. As some form of “soft law” (see similar Nolan, 2013), MSI principles and standards 
codify expectations that companies have to meet to gain or secure legitimacy in the eyes of 
important stakeholders. MSI standards amount to institutions that change the organizational 
field in which businesses operate. Put differently, in the field of corporate social 
responsibility, MSI norms are involved in defining the terms of trade in the market for 
legitimacy. 
On the other hand, MSIs do not only provide norms for corporate behavior. MSIs are 
also the result of corporate and stakeholder behavior. MSIs do not fall from heaven but come 
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into being as the product of purposeful decisions and negotiations of pioneer members with 
diverse interests. As the MSI attracts new members, followers might join for other reasons 
than did the original pioneers, thus creating a dynamic interplay of even more diverse 
interests. As the result of purposeful behavior, MSIs thus invite looking at the interests and 
interactions of the different stakeholders involved.  
Given their double nature both as norms for as well as the result of purposeful action, 
theoretical analyses of MSIs are so far either rooted in institutional theory or in club theory. 
These conceptualizations generated many valuable yet fragmented insights. For instance, club 
theory approaches to voluntary MSIs (Potoski & Prakash, 2005, 2009a; Prakash & Potoski, 
2007, 2009) offer perspectives on why companies join self-regulation initiatives. From this 
view, non-members become members if the anticipated benefit that they can gain from the 
club good – reputation – is greater than the costs of fulfilling the necessary CSR standards. 
However, club theory is less powerful in explaining the process of norm diffusion and why 
some companies join earlier and others later. In contrast, institutional theory has generated 
important insights into understanding MSIs as norms (Helms, Oliver, & Webb, 2012; Perez-
Batres, Miller, & Pisani, 2011), into how these norms create isomorphic pressures to adopt 
them (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), and into how corporate norm adoption leads to phenomena 
such as decoupling and creeping commitments (Haack, Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 2012). Yet, 
institutional theory often presupposes the existence of the norm and is less focused on 
investigating the rationale of the different actors starting the MSI. 
One of the reasons for the conceptual diversity in MSI research is the diversity of 
MSIs in real life. In effect, extant research has identified multiple types of voluntary MSIs 
which differ in their level or quality of the developed standard as well as their degree of 
reinforcement (Potoski & Prakash, 2009a; Rasche & MacLean, 2012). Moreover, Potoski and 
Prakash (2009a) raise concerns about the theoretical rigor as most research is based on single 
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or small-N comparative case studies. As a consequence, scholarship so far lacks 
generalizability.  
The purpose of this paper is thus to respond to the call by Potoski and Prakash (2009a) 
for a sounder theorization of the field. To this end, we combine club and institutional theory 
to derive a conceptual framework that can account for both the double nature of MSIs and 
their diversity in real life. The key aim is to generate insights into why actors join a voluntary 
MSI, how the various motivations and intentions of the actors influence the kind of standards 
developed, and how these as well as the MSI design are subsequently influenced by both 
external (institutional) and internal (club) dynamics.  
For this purpose, both institutional and club theory offer important insights. While 
institutional theory follows the general primacy of institutions – socially constructed rules and 
norms – as guide for human behavior, club theory is rooted in rational choice economics and 
thus emphasizes the individual motivation of actors as the main influential factor for their 
choices of behavior. Thus, by merging these approaches the effects of the various MSI 
stakeholders (civil society actors, the MSI secretariat, member and non-member companies) 
can be simultaneously conceptualized with external pressures that further shape behaviors.  
By so doing, we contribute to the literature in the following ways. We conceptually 
merge institutional and club theory which enables us to develop a stage model rooted in the 
diverse motivations and objectives of the stakeholders involved in the process as well as their 
adherence to external institutional pressures. This enables us to identify the critical stages 
where the interplay of the different external and internal dynamics influences how the MSIs 
develop in terms of membership and strictness of the voluntary standards.  
Our paper proceeds in three steps. First, following a brief overview of the current state 
of literature on self-regulation multi-stakeholder initiatives, we introduce our theoretical 
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framework. Here, we will briefly provide an overview of institutional theory, in particular 
institutionalization, institutional pressures, and institutional entrepreneurship, as well as of 
club theory. Moreover, we will also provide extant insights into MSIs derived from these 
theoretical approaches. We then elaborate our argument on why we consider their 
combination insightful for better understanding the emergence and development of MSIs and 
in particular potential tensions that may occur during these processes.  
In a third step, we will present a stage model of voluntary MSIs. We formulate 
propositions on the four stages – self-selection, initial negotiation, external dynamics, and 
internal dynamics. In a nutshell, we argue that once the initial members have self-selected 
themselves based on reasons such as wishing to co-produce exclusive reputational capital or 
to increase rivals’ cost, the MSI members will negotiate its further development in terms of 
both quality (level of the standard) as well as quantity (desired breadth of MSI membership). 
After the pioneering group agreed on a standard, this proto-institution will then be subject to 
external dynamics such as legitimization. These external dynamics may incentivize or push 
new members to join. This change in membership may in turn impact future negotiations on 
the standard’s further development.  
Fourth, we derive management and research implications and conclude with some 
final remarks.  
CLUB THEORY AND INSTITUTIONALIST PERPECTIVES ON MULTI-
STAKEHOLDER INITIATIVES AND STANDARD-SETTING 
This section serves three purposes. First, we provide our understanding of multi-
stakeholder initiatives, which we will use for the remainder of the paper. Second, we provide 
a brief review of the literature on self-regulating MSIs. In a third step, we introduce our 
theoretical framework that is based on the insights of club theory and institutional theory.  
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This paper’s definition of multi-stakeholder initiatives 
In the debate about “governance without governments” (Nolan, 2013; Rosenau & 
Czempiel, 1992), collective forms of self-regulation have gained a great deal of attention. 
Despite a multitude of terms used, we refer to this phenomenon as multi-stakeholder 
initiatives (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; Mena & Palazzo, 2012; O’Rourke, 2006; Utting, 2001)i 
as it emphasizes three facets important for our argument. First, the multi prefix stresses the 
collective dimension of these processes. Second, stakeholder underlines the diversity of 
interests of heterogeneous members and inherent differences in power between 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and companies (Baccaro & Mele, 2011). Finally, the 
word initiative points to the process from emergence to subsequent development. 
In addition, we focus on MSIs that possess the following four characteristics. First, the 
MSI must address common issues relevant to all or at least most companies in an industry or 
broader market. We thus exclude MSIs that are built around an individual company (for an 
example, see the Puma case in Roloff, 2008b) and look instead at MSIs as arenas for 
collective action (for an example, see the Forest Stewardship Council case in Pattberg, 2005).  
Second, the MSI must address problems that remain unresolved due to the absence of 
adequate state governance (as in Nolan, 2013). In this situation, the MSI offers voluntary 
regulation as a means to overcome the current global governance gaps, i.e. no company is 
obliged to join the MSI and to adhere to the set standards by any formal legal regulations 
(Prakash & Gugerty, 2010). Thus, MSIs that do not offer any regulatory aspects are also 
excluded (for an example see Schouten, Leroy, & Glasbergen, 2012).  
Third, and closely related to the first, we focus on MSIs with a global outreach, thus 
neglecting MSIs that provide local governance platforms (for an example, see Faysse, 2006).  
Actor and Institutional Dynamics in the Development of MSIs 
 8 
Fourth, the MSI must have at least some degree of formal organization to allow 
analyzing it as an independent entity and thus be able to distinguish between participating and 
nonparticipating actors. Note that participation can then be defined not only as formal 
membership but also as factually applying or publicly endorsing the MSI’s principles. 
A literature review on self-regulation through MSIs 
In the context of multi-stakeholder initiatives, the literature discusses a diversity of 
topics. These range from inherent management problems such as dealing with potential 
conflicts between members (Graz & Nölke, 2008), the emergence and development of such 
initiatives (Hemmati, 2002; Roloff, 2008a, 2008c) to analyses of their effectiveness and 
legitimacy (Bäckstrand, 2006; Mena & Palazzo, 2012; O’Rourke, 2006). However, in regard 
to our research question and our specific research object, the current literature informs us 
about two main points. First, the literature identifies MSIs as an arena where conflict or 
tensions may emerge (Graz & Nölke, 2008; Sethi & Schepers, 2013). Second, the literature 
considers MSIs from a process perspectives insinuating that the strategies and structures of 
the MSI change over time (e.g., Hemmati, 2002; Roloff, 2008a, 2008b). 
(1) One of the challenges MSIs face is the nonbinding character of standards (Gugerty, 
2010; Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Vogel, 2008), which can lead to shirking or free-riding (Potoski 
& Prakash, 2009a). Shirking occurs when participants take advantage of adopting MSI self-
regulations only in rhetoric but not in practice (Graz & Nölke, 2008; Potoski & Prakash, 
2009a). Free-riding in a more narrow sense occurs when non-participants benefit from an 
increased external perception that companies have become more socially responsible without 
actually joining the MSI (Potoski & Prakash, 2009a). Particularly, in the former case of 
shirking, conflicts between shirkers and non-shirkers (Conlon & Pecorino, 2004) may arise. 
Moreover, the easier shirking becomes, the greater the problem of adverse selection (Inderst, 
2005; Lenox & Nash, 2003) i.e. the inflow of ill-suited members that do not intend to fulfill 
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the standards but wish to benefit from potential reputational gains. Thus, one of the major 
challenges of MSIs is to manage “potential conflicts between participants” (Roloff, 2008b, p. 
313). Here, a reoccurring theme is that of sanctioning misbehavior (Potoski & Prakash, 2005). 
In short, the heterogeneity of actors, interests, and resources creates the need for an MSI to 
manage such tensions in order to avoid deadlock and conflict (Hemmati, 2002). 
(2) As MSIs are by definition networks that emerge and then evolve, a second strand 
of the literature looks at MSIs from a process viewpoint (e.g., Hemmati, 2002; Roloff, 2008a, 
2008b). Roloff (2008a, 2008b) provides a life-cycle model of multi-stakeholder networks that 
distinguishes seven possible phases of an MSI. According to this model, conflict management 
is a key challenge for MSIs in the acquaintance phase, as the participants initially need to 
establish common ground and a common discourse language (Roloff, 2008b). In particular, 
members need to familiarize themselves with their new roles and new kinds of relationships 
(e.g. cooperation instead of competition or cooperating instead of shaming) amongst each 
other (O’Rourke, 2006). Additionally, in the first agreement phase, conflict management 
serves to avoid strategic behavior that could undermine open discourse (Roloff, 2008a). In 
particular, Roloff (2008b) argues that most MSI get stuck between the deliberation process 
and the two agreement phases. Thus, members seem unable to kick-off implementation 
because they are continuously discussing the purpose, strategy, and operations of the 
particularities of the MSI. While this life-cycle model thus explains the effect of diverse or 
even conflicting stakeholder interests, it offers little interpretation as to why these 
stakeholders joined in the first place.  
We thus posit that an MSI needs to be aware of and effectively manage both potential 
conflict between different stakeholders and the process of its development. As the brief 
literature review above illustrates, however, so far little is known about how the two aspects 
interact or (in parts) how they come about. This gap is what our framework seeks to address. 
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A set of example MSIs that Appendix A describes in more detail will repeatedly be referred to 
in order to illustrate our framework.  
Grounding MSI’s in Club Theory and Institutional Theory 
To conceptually grasp the double nature of MSIs and to theorize the interplay between 
internal and external MSI dynamics we suggest combining club and institutional theory. Here, 
club theory provides an agentic perspective that enables the understanding of why actors join 
MSIs, whereas institutional theory then talks to the pressures the MSI faces once it is 
established. Interestingly, institutional entrepreneurship nicely links these two by providing an 
agentic perspective on the creation of norms.  
Club theory and voluntary standard-setting MSIs 
Club theory originates in economics and deals with the effects of club goods on club 
members and non-members (McNutt, 1999; Sandler & Tschirhart, 1997). Club goods are 
exclusive to a certain group of actors (members), yet non-rival within the club (Gugerty, 
2010). However, while the focus on club theory lies on the particularities of this special kind 
of public good, all clubs proffer club and private goods. Take the example of a golf club. All 
members can equally enjoy the golf court (non-rival). Yet, if one member uses the golf cart, 
other members cannot (rival and thus private good). Similar to “normal” public goods, all 
members must contribute to uphold the quality and availability of the club good.  
Actors join clubs if they perceive the anticipated benefits to be greater than the 
anticipated or known costs of joining (Fratianni & Pattison, 2001; McNutt, 1999). One of the 
challenges of clubs is to avoid shirking or free-riding. According to Olson (1965), actors’ 
incentives to free-ride and shirk – i.e. use benefits of clubs without bearing the costs – grow 
the larger the group. As group size increases, the risk of shirking increases as it becomes more 
difficult for members to monitor the behavior of all other members. At some point, this 
behavior then ultimately lowers the overall quality of the club goods as more members try to 
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avoid its costs. Put differently, clubs might suffer a multi-sided social dilemma (see similar 
Olson, 1965). Therefore, clubs need to find mechanisms to ensure the continuous contribution 
of their members as well as means to exclude non-conforming members (Potoski & Prakash, 
2009a).  
From a club theory perspective, MSIs can be conceptualized as clubs, since they offer 
an exclusive good – reputation – only to those actors that are club members (Bartley, 2009; 
Diaye, Ghabri, Greenan, & Pekovic, 2007; Gugerty & Prakash, 2010; Potoski & Prakash, 
2005, 2009a; Prakash & Potoski, 2007, 2009; Schuler, 2012). The exclusiveness of the 
reputation for socially responsible business conduct helps to solve a key issue of collective 
action: starting-up (P. Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira, 1985). To be precise, clubs organize 
collective action (Ostrom, 2000) to solve a prisoners’ dilemma that occurs when all 
companies fail to realize a shared interest because of their conflicting individual interests. 
With an effective club solution, only members can enjoy a benefit; and if this benefit 
outweighs the cost of joining and being more socially responsible, then companies are willing 
to join. This insight notwithstanding, there are no particular reasons why the first initiators 
begin the creation of new standards.   
Second, while clubs wish to overcome a social dilemma – i.e. allow companies to 
become more socially responsible without suffering competitive disadvantage – they 
experience a new dilemma. Specifically, the particular context of voluntary MSIs invites a 
more fine-grained understanding of the free-riding issue (Marwell & Oliver, 1993; Olsen, 
2009). Schuler (2012) extends the club theory framework by arguing that voluntary clubs also 
create public goods in addition to club and private goods. Here, the public goods are the 
positive social or environmental externalities created by the improvement of the CSR 
performance of MSI members (Gugerty, 2010). In this situation, two kinds of free-riding may 
occur: shirking and free-riding in a more narrow sense (Potoski & Prakash, 2009a). Here, 
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shirking refers to unwanted behavior by club members. As internal free-riders, shirkers are 
those actors that reap the reputational benefits of the MSI yet do not adhere to the required 
standards, while free-riding refers to non-member companies that enjoy positive reputation 
spill-overs to the entire industry. 
Third, as standards are voluntary, a key challenge for such MSIs is to attract members 
(Gugerty, 2010). Therefore, the net benefit of an MSI needs to be clear to non-members in 
order to incentivize joining. A membership benefit might be the higher credibility of 
cooperative voluntary standards in comparison to single-company responses (Bartley, 2009). 
This effect may increase with growing uncertainty. In such situations, the market of 
information about production conditions is likely to malfunction (Akerlof, 1970). Therefore, 
while allowing or even encouraging non-members to join, clubs also need to ensure that their 
standards are uphold, e.g. through monitoring (Bartley, 2009) or through the introduction of 
certification schemes (Spar & Yoffie, 2000). In addition, MSIs differ in their relative 
homogeneity. This constitutes an important characteristic as homogenous clubs are superior to 
mixed clubs in their performance (Berglas & Pines, 1981; Varughese & Ostrom, 2001). Since 
MSIs are often heterogeneous in their member base, the respective member contributions 
must be complementary in order to limit inefficiencies (see similar Brueckner & Kangoh, 
1989).  
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Club theory thus provides a powerful rational-choice perspective for explaining MSIs 
in terms of the relationship between individual incentives and collective action. At the same 
time, it leaves many open questions. For instance, club theory is unable to explain why some 
members join earlier than others (Prakash & Potoski, 2009) or why reputation gains are of 
such importance to company members. Additionally, it is limited in its capacity to fully 
explain the emergence of voluntary standards as it somewhat ignores the embeddedness of 
such undertakings in a wider environment (Bartley, 2009). Here, some of these questions may 
be answered through the application of institutional theory.  
An institutional perspective on MSIs 
Institutional theory is a powerful explanatory tool (Dacin, Goodstein, & Scott, 2002) 
that analyzes how the influence of institutions affects the behavioral choices of actors (Tolbert 
& Zucker, 1996). In this context, institutions are socially constructed taken-for-granted norms 
that limit the choices of behavior (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996; Zilber, 2002) due to habitualized 
practices (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002; Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) and shared meaning 
(Zilber, 2002).  
Institutional theory thus advocates the primacy of institutions for constraining 
behavior rather than intentional agency as in club theory. This effect on behavior can work in 
two ways. The first, more obvious effect occurs in the case of norm compliance. Yet, 
secondly, even if an actor resists compliance with an institution and engages in strategies to 
avoid the norm, this reaction is nonetheless provoked by institutions or more specifically by 
institutional pressures (Goodstein, 1994). In short, institutional pressures are forces in an 
actor’s environment that push towards specific widely accepted behaviors, as those are 
considered legitimate.  
While strategic responses to institutional pressures (e.g., Goodstein, 1994) or 
questions of homogenization of organizational forms due to institutional isomorphism 
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(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) have been widely discussed in the literature, the question of 
where institutions come from was neglected for some time (e.g., Pacheco, York, Dean, & 
Sarasvathy, 2010). Institutional agency or institutional entrepreneurship are relatively new 
concepts that acknowledge the creation of institutions through intentional agency (DiMaggio, 
1988; Greenwood, 2003; Hargrave & Van De Ven, 2006; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000). 
Whereas institutional agency emphasizes changes within organizations (Goodstein, 1994; C. 
Oliver, 1991), institutional entrepreneurship analyzes institutional changes within 
organizational fields (DiMaggio, 1988; Rao et al., 2000). Here, new institutions emerge 
through the interaction of actors (Zilber, 2002), which aim to break-down existing social 
structures (habits, practices) (Scott, 1995).  
The resulting proto-institutions (Lawrence et al., 2002) - i.e. institutions only adopted 
by some actors - then need to diffuse and be widely accepted so as to become “proper” 
institutions (e.g., Leblebic, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991; Strang & Meyer, 1993). 
Importantly, the process of institutionalization is not automatic (Zilber, 2002) and may fail 
along the way. However, the more members of a population oblige by a proto-institution, the 
greater its gain in legitimacy which in turn increases its likelihood of institutionalization 
(Hannan, 1986). In short, analogous to the creation of institutions, the diffusion and general 
adoption of institutions necessitates social interactions.  
Turning back to MSIs, institutional theory seems particularly suitable for three main 
areas. (1) Institutional entrepreneurship sheds light on how actors intentionally create 
institutions and try to institutionalize them. Thus, in our context, the pioneering members of 
an MSI actively engage in institution creation processes. Moreover, since the MSI’s mission 
is to set standards for entire industries or broader markets (see first criterion in our MSI 
definition), they are in need of institutionalizing their proto-institutions. (2) Once the proto-
institution has emerged, adopting the MSI norm through membership may become an 
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institution in itself. Thus, the more institutionalized the standard, the more difficult it becomes 
for non-members – that is non-adopter – to resist joining. (3) This is because the existence of 
the new institution shifts the expectation levels for organizational behavior. Thus, companies 
may feel the need to join the MSI in order to regain or maintain their current level of 
legitimacy as non-joining may result in reduced levels of sociopolitical legitimacy, which 
may incur costs for the company.  
So far, the current literature predominately addresses the second aspect: the 
institutionalization process of the MSI institution (e.g., Haack et al., 2012; Maguire, Hardy, & 
Lawrence, 2004) and only some address institutional entrepreneurship (Maguire et al., 2004). 
During institutionalization, mimetic – imitating others due to uncertainty – and normative – 
profession-based influences – isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) seem to have 
a great influence in the context of CSR (Perez-Batres et al., 2011). Moreover, Haack, 
Schoeneborn, and Wickert (2012a) identified various means of institutionalization. In 
particular, they argue that the mere verbal commitment to MSI standards by new members 
changes internal processes of the respective company, which in turn might lead to a higher 
CSR activity. This phenomenon is called creeping commitment (Haack et al., 2012).  
Despite these first insights into the process of institutionalization of MSI norms, little 
more is known about its emergence. Moreover, studies so far mostly neglected the issue or 
threat of deinstitutionalization (C. Oliver, 1992) or other changes in the MSI institutions 
(Zilber, 2002). The latter is of particular relevance as in practice many MSIs are accused of 
either not further advancing a given standard level or even watering down their standards over 
time (e.g., as in the case of FSC, see Moog, Spicer, & Böhm, 2014).  
To sum up, institutional theory sheds light on many of the pressing questions about the 
double nature of MSIs. Nonetheless, questions about the emergence of MSI norms, their 
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alterations over time, and their influence on different kinds of non-complying actors remain 
mostly unanswered. 
An institutional-club-theory perspective on MSIs 
For the purpose of this paper, we argue that it is beneficial to combine both club 
theory and institutional theory as their distinct perspectives on actor behavior – rooted either 
in norm compliance or intentional agentic behavior – supplement each other. Their respective 
insights help to fill the blank spots of the other perspective. Table 1 summarizes the 
complementarity of both theories in a condensed overview. 
------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------- 
In short, club theory helps to understand why actors join clubs at different stages of 
the club life-time. Institutional entrepreneurship underscores the process of institution 
creation while other streams of institutional theory inform us about the institutionalization 
process, and its consequent build-up of expectations for various actors. Moreover, once these 
pressures occur, club theory then sheds light on internal dynamics in response to external 
institutional pressures.  
A STAGE MODEL OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS CAUSED BY THE 
DOUBLE NATURE OF MSI’S 
This section aims to generate theoretical insights into the double nature of MSIs and its 
effects on the MSI development. In particular, we divide our conceptualization into four 
stages. These are the self-selection of pioneer members, the initial negotiations, the external 
dynamics caused by institutionalization processes, and the internal dynamics stage. Referring 
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to the propositions developed below, Figure 1 gives an overview of these four stages and their 
potential actor and institutional dynamics.  
Stage 1: Self-selection at the pre-set-up stage – who joins and why?  
The first crucial element that we need to understand is the underlying mechanisms of 
MSI set-up. Specifically, we look at why which kinds of pioneers (initial members) set up an 
MSI, given they have the free choice to do so.ii  
In this self-selection stage, pioneer members come together to pursue a common 
objective of closing governance gaps through business self-regulation. Given the intent to 
create a new institution, this collaboration of first-movers can be interpreted as an attempt of 
collective institutional entrepreneurship. To understand who self-selects for what reasons to 
join this initial coalition, we suggest looking at the underlying self-interests of the different 
actors.  
------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------- 
Intuitively, the first founding members for an MSI that come to mind are civil society 
organizations (CSOs) that are active in the respective field. Advocacy CSOs define their 
raison d’être in terms of addressing ecological, social, or human rights issues in various 
domains. Thus, if processes are kicked-off that might lead to business self-regulation in a 
CSO area of expertise, those respective CSOs willing to engage in partnerships are likely to 
participate so as to influence the process in a direction they consider favorable. As real-life 
examples show, CSOs often even act as initiators of these processes (e.g. the WWF in the 
case of the FSC). Similarly, some governmental actors may also become pioneering members 
if one of two situations arises. First, governments may support an initiative that addresses a 
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global governance gap that they cannot address unilaterally (e.g. OECD governments in the 
case of the EITI (EITI, 2013)). Second, if the governance gap is national or regional, 
governments might fear repercussions from other countries (see the sweatshop case in 
(Bartley, 2009)). Coming back to the institutional entrepreneurship perspective, both civil 
society and governmental actors can thus play an important role in the initial institutional 
entrepreneurial coalition by holding the necessary “subject position” (Maguire et al., 2004) to 
serve as agenda-setters and coalition conveners to attract or bring together other – in our case 
business – MSI members. Take the example of the FSC. Here, companies in the timber 
industry were already considering standards to protect their vital resource. However, only 
when the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) entered the discussion and brought actors 
together did the FSC certification move forward (FSC, 2014). By the same token, the WWF 
played a similar role in the Marine Stewardship Council and in the Roundtable for Sustainable 
Palm Oil.  
In MSIs, CSOs and governmental actors partner with business members. However, 
MSIs typically start with only a small sub-group of businesses who self-select to be pioneer 
members, a fact that invites looking at the underlying self-interest that propels companies to 
voluntarily create self-regulations. Here, we suggest distinguishing two forms of self-
interested motivations for a company to be an MSI pioneer: first, illustrating arguments 
proposed by club theory, companies seek to create a difference from poorly performing 
competitors by establishing an exclusive club that provides them with distinctive reputational 
capital; second, illustrating the idea of institutional entrepreneurship, companies can try to 
establish the same norm for their competitors in the attempt to improve their position in the 
context of firm rivalry. 
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Building exclusive reputation through the creation of clubs  
Here, the logic is that companies partner with other stakeholders and above all other 
companies to co-create reputation as a club good. MSI membership then serves to provide a 
signal that a member company fulfills a certain level of superior sustainability performance. 
Note that this reputation-based rationale can exist in a defensive and in a pro-active 
way. In the defensive case, companies with high reputational capital at risk (such as global 
consumer brands (Bartley, 2009; Lenox & Nash, 2003) are ready to partner with others and 
establish an MSI in order to jointly fence off reputational risks for two somewhat interlinked 
reasons. On the one hand, if one company is attacked by civil society organizations, generally 
other firms within the industry suffer (King, Lenox, & Barnett, 2001) as the discussion 
quickly changes from “company x” to “those textile companies”. By working together in a 
club companies protect each other. On the other hand, firm behavior is steered by anticipated 
repercussions. Interestingly, this behavior may be explained through institutional theory. 
Institutions are expectations to guide the behavior of actors (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). Thus, if 
companies anticipate that there might be a potential loss in reputation if they do not 
participate early in an MSI, they act on anticipated institutional pressures. Such anticipation 
might be rooted in past experience, regardless of whether it was their own or that of other 
businesses.  
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) provides an example for how pioneer 
companies self-selected to establish the MSI based on reputation-driven considerations. When 
the FSC was started in 1993, a key founding member was B&Q – not only one of the largest 
UK hardware and wood-products retailers but also a prime target of citizen protests during 
tropical timber boycotts in the 1980s. IKEA quickly followed suit. As “public relations 
sensitive firms”, these first-movers thus used the MSI to defend themselves against 
reputational risks (Moog et al., 2014, p. 9). 
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In the offensive case, sustainability pioneers wish to distinguish themselves from 
competitors that are less socially responsible. From a club theory perspective (McNutt, 1999; 
Potoski & Prakash, 2009a), we can conclude that if each member contributes a certain level of 
performance (their costs) and thereby reputation to the club, they will benefit from the 
reputation of the others in addition to their own reputation. Indeed, in the case of EITI, 
Schuler (2012) showed that companies had a greater likelihood of supporting EITI when they 
wished to differentiate themselves based on their social performance. Additionally, such a 
strategy might be of particular interest for companies that so far lack visibility. These 
companies are then able to benefit from the greater visibility of others, as this will in turn 
raise their visibility.  
Despite very different rationales, in both the defensive and offensive case the MSI 
serves as a club to jointly produce a reputational good with which members can communicate 
more credibly to be different from the (poorly performing) rest of the market. Put differently, 
companies try to achieve competitive advantage through committing themselves to standards 
that make them different from competitors. Here, companies’ desire to secure or increase their 
individual reputation creates an incentive to coalesce with others to produce reputation as a 
club good. 
We thus posit: 
Proposition 1a: The higher the potential reputational benefits or the higher the 
perceived risk to one’s brand value, the more likely are businesses to become 
pioneering members of standard-setting MSIs.  
Using institutional entrepreneurship to change the context of firm rivalry  
The reputation-based first strategy was about creating a club that allows companies 
communicating that they are different from their competitors with a poorer sustainability 
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performance. The second rationale follows a different logic. Here, companies could gain a 
competitive advantage if the entire industry was bound by the same standard or norm. In this 
case, companies become pioneers in initiating an MSI if they expect the new standard to 
improve their position compared to another group of competitors. Thus, they act as collective 
institutional entrepreneurs and try to influence the type of proto-institution that will be 
developed to their own advantage. Here again, there is a defensive and an offensive version of 
this strategy. 
In the defensive variant, companies want to make sure that competitors are pressured 
to bear the same costs that they already bear or are likely to bear in the future. Examples 
include companies that are subject to legislation in their home country or that experience 
pressure from a strong stakeholder. By engaging in institutional entrepreneurship aimed at 
expanding the range of these norms to other firms, companies can defend themselves against 
costs that they would need to otherwise bear unilaterally.  
In the offensive variant, companies do not defend themselves against idiosyncratic 
external pressures. Rather, following the resource based view (Wernerfelt, 1984), companies 
differ in the internal ability to achieve a certain sustainability performance (McWilliams, Van 
Fleet, & Cory, 2002). If a company possesses special resources such as expertise, 
technologies that are difficult to imitate, or exclusive access to specific supplies (such as 
organic raw material), it can meet the same sustainability performance at cheaper costs than 
its competitors. Institutional entrepreneurship aimed at establishing new sustainability 
standards through an MSI can therefore serve to create pressures for raisings one’s rivals’ 
costs (McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006).  
An illustration of an attempt of institutional entrepreneurship to change the context of 
firm rivalry through an MSI can be found in the early stage of the EITI. Here, Shell and a 
small group of other EITI pioneers indicated that they would comply with mandatory 
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regulation; however, only if all competitors were also required to do so (Haufler, 2010). This 
can be interpreted as a first-mover signal of companies who would benefit from a new 
industry norm – be it in a defensive way because Shell felt that it already experienced 
individual pressures to bear at least some costs that others should bear as well or in an 
offensive way to use its superior performance to raise rivals’ cost. In the end, however, other 
EITI pioneers blocked this attempt, as they were not interested in mandatory regulation. 
Arguably, the reason for which they joined as first movers might have been to create 
reputational benefits in a defensive way. 
Despite the differences between the defensive and offensive variant of institutional 
entrepreneurship, both cases have in common that a company benefits from pushing for a 
norm whose broad(er) application improves the competitive position of the firm. Being a 
pioneer in the establishment of a new MSI then amounts to a form of institutional 
entrepreneurship to establish such a norm. 
We thus posit:  
Proposition 1b: The more a new norm would improve a company’s competitive 
position, the more likely is a company to welcome and participate in the set-up of an 
MSI that seeks to promote this norm. 
Stage 2: Set-up stage – negotiating the terms of MSI scope and membership 
Companies thus do not join the set-up phase of a new MSI randomly. Rather, they 
self-select based on their self-interest in reputation-building or influencing the competitive 
context. However, as shown above, companies are not the only actors in a multi-stakeholder 
initiative. Next to companies, civil-society organizations and governmental organizations, the 
MSI secretariat might also become a separate internal stakeholder once the MSI is established 
as an independent organization. As processes of institutional entrepreneurship are inherently 
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political (Maguire et al., 2004), the different self-interests outlined in the previous subsection 
will lead to an internal political struggle. In particular, in order to create proto-institutions 
members need to reach a state of congruent meaning and consequent practices (Zilber, 2002). 
Thus, they need to agree on what the MSI’s concrete purpose and mechanisms will be.  
In her life-cycle model of MSIs, Roloff (2008b) addresses these points in her 
“acquaintance” and “agreement” phases. Despite her generated insights, this model falls short 
of elaborating how the interaction between various interests results in different types of MSI 
standards. To classify these different MSI types, Potoski and Prakash (2009a) develop a two-
by-three matrix that yields six different types of MSIs. On one axis, MSIs can be 
differentiated based on their stringency or lenience. On the other dimension, they are strong, 
medium or weak “swords” i.e. have high or low sanctioning mechanisms. Each of the six 
types of MSI yields different degrees of reputation benefits (Schuler, 2012). While this 
typology is helpful to compare the regulatory output produced by an MSI, it is less conducive 
for our purpose of analyzing the potentially diverging interests of the MSI pioneers involved 
in the process of creating this output. In order to consider the respective interests of the 
pioneer members addressed in propositions 1a and 1b, we therefore suggest referring not to 
the level of the standard and the level of sanctioning but to the level of the standard and the 
number of desired members. Based on this distinction, we can now look at how the partially 
conflicting interests of member stakeholders create different ‘pushs’ whose interaction 
influences which type of standard emerges in this process.  
The push for selective MSI membership  
Those companies seeking to distinguish themselves through membership in the MSI 
club seek to increase the joint production of reputation in two ways. First, as reputation also 
results from visibility, the club’s reputation can increase if the MSI attracts more company 
members (or companies who apply the standard). Second, however, overall reputation will 
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only increase if the new members have a sustainability performance that is high enough to 
add positive reputation to the group. In other words, new members need to share the cost of 
high sustainability performance (McNutt, 1999). Otherwise, poor sustainability performers 
would not only shirk on the group’s reputation but might actually destroy the club’s 
reputation. This may happen as outsiders are not able to distinguish shirkers from non-
shirkers (Potoski & Prakash, 2009a). Thus, if one company performs poorly, consumers or 
civil society actors are likely to collectively blame and shame the MSI as a whole. Therefore, 
the club good value would be greatly diminished. Correspondingly, clubs with high 
stringency create higher club goods (Potoski & Prakash, 2009a). As a consequence, 
companies interested in the production of reputation will favor the exclusive growth of the 
MSI limited by strict screening and monitoring to prevent adverse selection and shirking. We 
thus propose: 
Proposition 2a: The greater the influence of companies that seek to secure their 
reputation, the greater the pull towards exclusive growth, that is increasing 
membership of good sustainability performers and restricting membership to poor 
sustainability performers. 
In addition, there may be a further type of reputation-seeking companies that wish to 
expand membership selectively. However, the increase in membership is not meant in terms 
of company members but in terms of civil society actors. If companies perceive not only 
reputation but also legitimacyiii as their club good, they are interested in the participation of 
civil society organizations. These actors are usually carriers of legitimacy in their respective 
field of sustainability. Thus, if more such actors participate in the MSI, the legitimacy of the 
MSI and thus of its entire member base increases. In other words, the participating civil 
society actors give their stamp of approval not only to the MSI but to its members 
simultaneously.  
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Proposition 2b: The greater the influence of companies that seek to increase their 
legitimacy, the greater the pull towards the inclusion of relevant civil society actors.  
The push for broad membership  
If we now consider those businesses that wish to change the competitive context of 
their rivals, we find different interests. As argued above, some companies might benefit from 
a new norm if norm compliance increases rivals’ costs. Consequently, such business 
institutional entrepreneurs have a nuanced interest in the type of MSI standard developed. To 
start with, these companies would prefer a standard that is strict enough to create meaningful 
costs for competitors. Given the voluntary nature of self-regulation, however, high standards 
render it unlikely that many competitors actually join the MSI and commit to the new norm 
(Potoski & Prakash, 2009a). Consequently, especially in the defensive variant aimed at 
creating a level playing field, the institutional entrepreneurs will prefer a standard that, while 
keeping a minimum standard, allows wider membership through lenient requirements and 
low-entry barriers. Potoski and Prakash (2009a) come to a similar conclusion by arguing that 
lenient weak sword MSIs are likely to increase their membership the fastest. Here, they refer 
to the “network effect” that happens as more and more members join. Taking an institutional 
theory perspective, we can conceptualize these networks effects as self-reinforcing 
institutional pressures that non-members experience. While these institutional pressures 
strictly speaking do not occur before stage 3, we suggest that pioneer businesses wish to 
create such institutional pressures by promoting membership and norm compliance. Since the 
future degree of taken-for-grantedness depends on the inclusiveness of membership, pioneer 
businesses seeking to establish such an institution will push for broader membership while 
demanding a minimum standard. By so doing, these companies hope to ensure quick build-up 
of institutional pressures while making rivals “pay” as the latter will need to fulfill at least 
some kind of standard they did not before. Based on our argumentation, we conjecture: 
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Proposition 2c: The greater the influence of companies that seek to alter the context of 
firm rivalry, the greater the push to expand MSI membership while keeping a 
minimum standard.  
The influence of civil society organizations 
Since an MSI has civil society actors as their founding members, it is important to 
understand their preference in respect to the qualitative and quantitative elements of the MSI 
standard. As civil society actors seek to create impact i.e. induce large-scale positive change 
within society or for the environment (Bradach, 2010), they will, on the one hand, tend 
towards a larger membership, as only a change in many businesses will have significant 
impact on society. On the other hand, their mission focus also propels them towards wanting 
high standards. Again, however, there is a tradeoff between strict standards and inclusive 
membership.  
In the case of the FSC, this core dilemma was faced at the time of its founding months, 
namely the decision to opt for a fast-growth strategy as a means to set a global benchmark 
(Moog et al., 2014). While key environmental organizations were favouring the highest 
possible standards also at the cost of only having a small membership base, “those 
voices arguing that the scheme must aim for the greatest immediate impact by capturing the 
broadest possible segment of the global consumer market won the day” (ibid.).  
By this logic, CSO actors would strive to achieve a balance between large membership 
and high standards. Thus, we posit: 
Proposition 2d: The greater the influence of mission-driven actors, the greater the 
push towards increasing impact by striking a balance between broad membership and 
standard strictness. 
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In sum, the self-selection effects of the pre-set-up phase of an MSI can bring together 
different actors with diverse and, more importantly, conflicting interests. In particular, the 
interests of reputation-seeking companies in restricting membership clashes with the interest 
of companies who want to gain competitive advantages by promoting the taken-for-
grantedness of a new norm through low entry barriers and wide membership. At the same 
time, reputation-seeking companies welcome the inclusion of reputable CSOs who, in turn, 
however, bring in a middle-position that seeks to strike a balance between broader 
membership and strict standards. As a consequence of these diverse interests, the initial 
negotiation phase of an MSI is a highly political process that can easily lead to the failure of 
an MSI. Indeed, Roloff’s (2008) life cycle model indicates that many MSIs are stuck in the 
agreement phase. Only if the MSI can meet the essential interests of the various internal and 
external stakeholders, can it gain output legitimacy (Bäckstrand, 2006). Achieving such a 
state needs to reflect the relative power of the key members. As the next section shows, 
however, the very success of an MSI triggers institutional dynamics that may destabilize this 
delicate power balance.  
Stage 3: External dynamics – the building up of external expectations and the inflow of new 
members 
As institutional theory informs us, proto-institutions may only become “proper” 
institutions if they are adopted by actors that were not part of their development (Lawrence et 
al., 2002). Note that regardless of the outcome of stage 2 – exclusive club or minimum 
standard club – pioneers will have an interest in institutionalizing the MSI norm. As a 
consequence, the MSI will seek to bring forward its proto-institution in either case. Going 
back to institutional entrepreneurship, it is most likely that the MSI will do so by providing 
meaning and by linking its new practice to existing practices (Maguire et al., 2004). This 
Actor and Institutional Dynamics in the Development of MSIs 
 28 
process may then create reactions within the external environment of the MSI. We suggest 
that, depending on the scenario, at least one of two mechanisms occurs.  
The attraction of shirkers 
In the first scenario, a high-reputation club that reflects the assumptions of club theory 
(Potoski & Prakash, 2009a) has been established during stage 2. In this situation, the club 
good – high reputation for sustainability performance – generates the incentive for so-far non-
participating companies to be part of the club, no matter whether they are high- or low-
sustainability performers. For both groups, club membership would offer desirable reputation 
effects. For the latter group of low sustainability performers, however, the club may offer an 
opportunity to gain sustainability reputation without actually having to be more sustainable in 
their operations. Put into the wording of club theory, such clubs are very attractive for 
potential shirkers (E. Ostrom, 1990). Without sufficient and effective screening mechanisms, 
these exclusive club MSIs therefore run the risk of facing adverse selection (Lenox & Nash, 
2003). We thus propose:  
Proposition 3a: The higher the perceived club good of reputation, the greater the push 
of non-participants with lower sustainability performance to become members in 
order to (at least partially) free-ride on that club good creating the problem of 
adverse selection. 
The external push to join 
As the MSI strives for institutionalizing its proto-institution, we now take on an 
institutional theory perspective to identify another external dynamic. Generally speaking, the 
process of institutionalization creates and requires legitimacy. While legitimacy is gained 
during institutionalization, this process is unlikely to start without any initial legitimacy. In 
particular, two types of legitimacy are of importance: cognitive and sociopolitical (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994). For cognitive legitimacy to occur, outside actors need to understand the 
Actor and Institutional Dynamics in the Development of MSIs 
 29 
institution or trust the institutional entrepreneur (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Understanding a 
novel institution, however, requires learning over time. That is why we suggest that existing 
trust in already well-known actors plays a more significant role in the early stages of an MSI. 
By this logic, external stakeholders gain trust in the MSI due to the membership of reputable 
civil society organizations. Once cognitive legitimacy has then been established, 
sociopolitical legitimacy – acceptance by society – can follow.  
If the MSI gains some degree of legitimacy, this in turn may lead to two interlinked 
effects. First, non-participating companies that seek legitimacy in regard to sustainability 
issues may turn to the MSI due to its established legitimacy. In situations of uncertainty, 
actors are prone to imitate the behavior of actors that they perceive as best-practice or well-
established (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). As the MSI consists of members with a moderate to 
high sustainability performance, non-participants with a lower sustainability performance 
might perceive that behavior as legitimate. Thus, they follow mimetic isomorphic pressures 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Indeed, the case of the UNGC indicates that mimetic pressures 
are a core element in UNGC participation (Perez-Batres et al., 2011). Thus, we propose: 
Propositions 3b: The greater the perceived legitimacy of the MSI norm, the greater 
the likelihood that companies with lower sustainability performance will join the MSI 
to overcome uncertainty.  
The perceived legitimacy also has a second effect. With increasing institutionalization 
the MSI norm may replace previous norms of appropriate behavior. Due to this increased 
visibility and acceptance, external stakeholders such as government agencies, non-member 
civil society organizations, or consumers may push a company into joining the MSI, thus 
creating coercive isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Companies may then 
regard MSI membership as a quasi-law or–to use the legal term–soft law (Nolan, 2013). For 
instance, Campbell (2007) found that companies are more likely to follow sustainable 
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business conducts in environments where such behavior is expected. In the case of UNGC, 
European companies show a greater tendency to join self-regulations as the demand for such 
behavior by both European society and governments is greater than in other areas (Perez-
Batres et al., 2011). Thus, due to institutional pressures brought forward by other external 
actors, non-participating companies are expected to enter the MSI. Note that this effect 
applies to non-participating companies irrespective of whether they have a high or low 
sustainability performance. We thus posit: 
Proposition 3c: The greater the visibility of an MSI and the consequent institutional 
pressures other actors can create, the stronger will be outside pressures for non-
participants to join the MSI. 
Moreover, we argue that if those companies that wish to change the competitive field 
prevailed during stage 2 and lower standards were decided on, this effect becomes even 
greater. If companies perceive the standard to be obtainable without prohibitive costs, they are 
more likely to join in response to external pressures. In contrast, if standards are high and 
cost-intensive, non-participants will be more likely to strategically choose to resist the new 
institution. We thus conjecture: 
Proposition 3d: The lower the standards, the sooner will non-participants yield to 
external pressures to join the MSI. 
When linking the two effects described above, we observe a self-reinforcing 
mechanism. If companies join the MSI regardless for what reason – mimetic isomorphism or 
institutional pressures –, these behavioral choices further alter the institutional landscape for 
the remaining non-participants. For those joining to overcome uncertainty, the MSI becomes 
even more attractive as the perceived legitimacy has increased due to an increase in 
membership. Similarly, increased membership and visibility makes it more likely that 
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external stakeholders such as analysts, investors, CSOs, or other firms take norm compliance 
for granted and in turn raise their coercive pressure on non-participants.  
The EITI can be interpreted as providing an example of the effects discussed here. As 
most companies were reluctant to accept a high level standard, the EITI effectively lowered 
company requirement, thereby entering the route into becoming what Potoski and Prakash 
(2009) call lenient standards. In the years following the shift in company requirements, 
participant numbers not only started growing but after 2006 even accelerated (see Table 2). 
From 2006 onward, the higher the number of “supporting companies,” the greater the number 
of new companies that joined the initiative. Arguably, the growth of the MSI created a self-
reinforcing pressure on non-participating companies to join EITI. We conjecture that this was 
due to an emerging social norm of “resource transparency” which led companies to consider it 
necessary to endorse the EITI, at least in rhetoric (Aaronson, 2011; Gillies, 2010). In contrast, 
companies whose continued existence is less dependent on their reputation, such as state-
owned companies in China (China National Petroleum Company), Russia (Lukoil), and 
Indonesia (Petronas), who are not under the scrutiny of NGOs and private investors did not 
feel the need, so far (as of September 2014), to join EITI as supporting members (Aaronson, 
2011).  
------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------- 
In short, both effects of mimetic and coercive isomorphic pressures further increase 
both membership and visibility, thus pushing even more companies into the MSI. We thus 
propose: 
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Proposition 3e: The larger the MSI becomes in terms of its membership, the greater 
the pressures for non-participants to join which leads to a self-reinforcing process of 
increasing membership.  
As a consequence of this spiral of institutional pressures and actor behavior, the 
composition of MSI members is likely to change. There is a tendency that new members who 
are pressured to join the MSI display a poorer sustainability performance than earlier 
members. The reason is that first those companies are likely to join that can at least partially 
fulfill the required MSI norm. Very poor performers might only join once pressures are built 
up so highly that they are unable to further resist them. Consequently, we suggest: 
Proposition 3f: The greater the pressure to join, the more the respective sustainability 
performance of new members will tend to be lower.  
In short, the success of the MSI (visibility, membership, norm institutionalization) 
creates institutional pressures for so-far non-participating companies to join/apply the 
standard. As a consequence, the composition of company members changes. While self-
selection effects in the pre-set-up stage brought together companies with a superior 
sustainability performance, new firms now enter with a somewhat poorer sustainability 
performance.  
Stage 4: Internal dynamics – pushes to change the MSI norm 
As institutional dynamics change the self-selection effects of new MSI members, the 
composition of MSI company membership changes as well. This change in membership may, 
in turn, affect the MSI norm (institution). This is because actors carry the meaning of 
institutions; thus, if actors change, so do the institutions (Zilber, 2002).  
Despite potential differences in their goals, during stage 1, positive selection effects 
ensured that pioneers were likely to share not only a superior level of sustainability 
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performance but also some form of (negotiated) goal congruence. With expanding 
membership both factors are likely to change. As some of the followers (non-pioneer 
members) enter the MSI due to uncertainty or institutional pressures, not only their 
sustainability performance but, more importantly, their interests are likely to at least partially 
diverge from that of the pioneers. This is in line with Tolbert and Zucker’s (1996) stage 
model of institutionalization, which postulates that in the objectification, once the proto-
institution was launched, the group of adopters becomes increasingly heterogeneous, turning 
the previously observed imitative impetus of participating companies into a normative 
impetus for diffusion (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). In other words, new members are 
increasingly likely to join based on a “coerced egoist” CSR logic (Husted & Salazar, 2006). 
Here, companies join an MSI not because they care about the actual MSI mission but because 
they respond to e.g. coercive isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). At this point, 
club theory and institutional theory predict similar patterns as club theory also predicts 
difficulties with an increase in heterogeneity within clubs (McNutt, 1999).  
For that reason, we argue that the MSI enters into another round of – explicit or 
implicit – negotiations. Yet, in this stage, the focus is more internally as some of the new 
members try to influence the further development of the MSI norm. Thus, in order to 
understand the new internal dynamics, we need to understand the interests of new members. 
To this end, we introduce three new internal stakeholders: the MSI secretariat, shirking 
reputation-seeking followers, and institutionally pressured followers. For the purpose of 
analytical clarity, we conjecture that the interests of pioneers remain the same.  
The MSI secretariat and potential tendencies toward enlarging the MSI 
There is a great deal of literature that analyzes MSIs as networks or forums for mutual 
discourse (L. W. Fransen & Kolk, 2007; O’Rourke, 2006; Roloff, 2008a, 2008c), but to our 
knowledge, no literature investigates the MSI itself as an independent entity able to interact 
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with other internal and external stakeholders. This lacuna is surprising because almost every 
MSI relies on some sort of secretariat that is not free of organizational self-interests but also 
has a stake in the development of the initiative. While we insinuate that the MSI secretariat 
and its interests may already exist in stage 2, during this phase their status is still very 
rudimentary and closer to a position of mere coordination (e.g. meeting scheduling). Yet, 
once the MSI has gained visibility, the MSI secretariat also gains recognition for instance in 
its role of providing information to outsiders or handling public relations.  
For the MSI secretariat, communication of the MSI’s activities and, especially, its 
success is crucial not only for raising public awareness of the MSI but also for securing future 
resources. However, unlike for-profit firms, which have easily communicable figures such as 
sales or profit, nonprofit organizations often find it difficult to demonstrate measurable, 
quantitative success (Ebrahim & Rangan, 2010). To overcome this problem, they often 
attempt to make their achievements seem more tangible by defining quantitative proxies of 
performance (Bagnoli & Megali, 2009; Nicholls, 2005). 
MSIs can face similar problems of defining and communicating success. Indeed, since 
attaining resources critically depends on perceived legitimacy, the MSI secretariat is under 
pressure to deliver “tangible outcomes.” In its set-up and internal negotiation stage, one 
important tangible outcome could be the generation of a new standard or principle (see 
above). Once the standard exists, however, the MSI secretariat needs to find another way of 
documenting success. In the early stages, in particular, external stakeholders lack means to 
evaluate the performance of the venture, which is, however, essential for gaining and 
maintaining cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). It is at this point that the number of 
MSI company members can become a proxy for mission fulfillment. Yet, as known from the 
nonprofit literature, such proxies may trigger a “what you measure is what you get” effect 
(Lindgren, 2001; Spitzer, 2007). Thus, if MSI secretariats measure and communicate their 
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progress based on growth in membership, the MSI secretariat may increasingly shift its 
attention toward increasing the MSI membership. 
According to some critics, the UNGC is an illustration of this phenomenon, as, over 
time, it arguably abandoned its initial mission to instead opt “for a deceptively simple 
alternative claim of success, emphasizing the number of UNGC signatory companies” (Sethi 
& Schepers, 2013, p. 11). Similarly, with regard to the EITI, Haufler (2010, p. 65) notes that 
from its initiation in 2002 until about 2006, “the proponents of the EITI struggled to expand 
its membership,” both in terms of participating companies and participating countries. Indeed, 
the U.K. government—a key external stakeholder—“pushed to gain more participation” 
(ibid.) – which led to various changes in the EITI strategy. One element of these changes in 
the EITI was that while tightening requirements for governments, requirements for 
participating companies were loosened. Instead of requiring participating companies to 
commit to a minimum transparency standard, EITI implemented a new “supporting company” 
status with rather vague – and strictly voluntary – commitments.  
Against this background, we propose: 
Proposition 4a: The more and the longer the MSI’s legitimacy depends on 
communicating quantifiable measures of success, the more likely is the MSI 
secretariat to work toward increasing the MSI through additional members. 
A further divergence in interest – new company members 
Reputation-seeking followers with the intent to shirk join the MSI in order to free-ride 
on the reputation of other members. As such, they are not interested in further increasing the 
membership base of the MSI. After all, MSIs with lower standards also proffer lower 
reputational value to their members (Potoski & Prakash, 2009a). The reason is that other 
shirkers would reduce the overall quality of the reputational club good. Consequently, 
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shirkers who managed to somehow sneak into the MSI would, once in it, prefer high entry-
barriers for so-far non-participating members or at least oppose reducing the level of MSI 
standard as this may reduce the reputational value they seek. Thus, somewhat ironically, the 
interests of reputation-seeking followers and reputation-seeking pioneers point in the same 
direction, yet for different reasons. We thus conjecture: 
Proposition 4b: The greater the influence of new member companies that seek to 
increase their reputation, the greater the push towards exclusive growth, that is 
increasing membership of good sustainability performers and restricting membership 
to poor sustainability performers.  
In contrast, those followers that were pushed into the MSI due to institutional 
pressures would have very different interests. First, as they are likely to have a poorer 
sustainability performance (otherwise they would not have to be pushed into the self-
regulation), their interest in tightening the standard is limited. In effect, their preference is 
likely to lower the standard instead. By so doing, they would incur less cost in abiding to the 
MSI norms. Second, pressured followers would however be interested in an increase in 
membership. The rationale is that the inclusion of additional members with a poor 
sustainability performance will make it very difficult to further tighten the standards. In the 
extreme, the poor sustainability performers might even capture the self-regulation process and 
effectively water down the existing standard. Thus, in contrast to the pioneers aiming to raise 
rivals’ costs, coerced new members, whilst agreeing to increase membership as widely as 
possible, do not wish to keep or tighten a certain minimum standard. We thus propose: 
Proposition 4c: The greater the influence of companies that were pressured into MSI 
membership, the stronger the push towards inclusive growth and reducing MSI 
standards. 
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A possible trajectory – the downward spiral 
As the previsions propositions demonstrated, the diverse actor and institutional 
dynamics in the development of an MSI create ‘pushs’ that can direct an MSI into very 
different trajectories. We will now take out one particular scenario to illustrate one of many 
possible such trajectories. In this scenario, the majority of followers was pressured into 
joining and did not perceive a decisive reputational gain. Furthermore, due to institutional 
dynamics addressed in proposition 3e, the relative number of coerced members is increasing. 
In this situation, we conjecture that a self-reinforcing process of watering down the MSI 
standard becomes increasingly probable. Our argument goes as follows:   
The more institutionally pressured companies with poorer sustainability performances 
join, the higher not only their number but also their influence, be it through formal voting 
procedures or the more informal influence of their sheer numbers. If coerced followers have 
increasing influence, joining the MSI therefore becomes less risky for other, so-far non-
participating companies with poorer sustainability performance. In related work, Lenox and 
Nash (2003) discuss the problem of adverse selection in industry self-regulation that arises 
when at some point lower quality firms seek to participate. They argue that without 
mechanisms for ensuring compliance with program objectives, “bad firms will join to receive 
the insurance and signaling benefits of membership” (Lenox & Nash, 2003, p. 4) without 
engaging in the required effort. Indeed, if entry is left unrestricted, in time “adverse selection 
will undermine self-regulatory programs” (ibid., p. 2). An increasing number of members may 
then require the MSI to accommodate increasingly divergent interests, which, in turn, makes 
it even more tempting for poor performing followers to become members (Sethi & Schepers, 
2013). We therefore posit: 
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Proposition 5a: The greater the number of poor performing and coerced companies 
that join the MSI, the more attractive the MSI becomes to other poorer performing 
companies. 
What will be the effect of an increasing number of members who wish to lower the 
MSI standards? Haack et al. (2012) argue that the act of joining or publicly adopting a norm 
can lead to creeping commitments. The underlying mechanism is that post-adoption 
discursive processes will eventually lead to an internal identity transformation (Haack et al., 
2012). If this is correct, it means that these followers will change their preferences through 
discursive practices and eventually develop a positive interest in the MSI mission. This is why 
Haack et al. (2012) view low entry barriers to joining as appropriate for promoting the MSI 
norm. 
We agree that discursive practices can play a relevant role in constructing actor 
identities and interests. However, we challenge the assumption that discursive norm adoption 
necessarily leads to these effects. On the contrary, if followers behave strategically and pay 
only lip service to a certain norm, we claim that allowing their admission can have 
counterproductive effects for the MSI. As the proportion of such followers increases, they 
gain, all else equal, more power in the democratic and deliberative processes within an MSI. 
Due to their different interests, the MSI then runs the risk of “regulatory capture”iv (Laffont & 
Tirole, 1991) as a result of enlarged membership. In short, low entry barriers for adoption do 
not necessarily guarantee self-reinforcing identity transformation but may trigger self-re-
enforcing strategic behavior. 
According to Cheit (1990, p. 176), “most private standards are ‘consensus’ standards 
[… ] This process seems practically designed to ensure that standards-setters follow the path 
of least resistance.” By this logic, private standard setting can be “controlled by those who 
want the least done” (Rasche & MacLean, 2012, p. 4), which illustrates why an enlargement 
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process continuously focused on attracting new (lower performing) members may create a 
conflict between these new members who might, instead of engaging in transformative 
discourse, engage in “obstructionist participation, creating discord and blocking decision-
making on sensitive issues” (Truex & Søreide, 2010, p. 7). Again, critics see the UNGC as a 
good example in that, according to Sethi and Schepers (2013), the initiative suffers from a 
promise-performance gap, as public delisting of companies remains the only sanction of the 
initiative and its practices constitute “an open invitation to entice the worst performing 
companies to become signatories in good standing, i.e., adverse selection and free-rider gone 
amok” (for similar arguments, see Berliner & Prakash, 2012). We thus posit: 
Proposition 5b: The greater the relative number of companies who join based on 
institutional pressures, the more likely are tendencies toward loosening the standards 
promoted by the MSI. 
While institutional entrepreneurs are able to create institutions (DiMaggio, 1988), for 
those proto-institutions to become taken-for-granted they simultaneously destroy existing 
institutions. The latter process is often called deinstitutionalization (C. Oliver, 1992). We 
conjecture that if the above-described scenario is uninhibited, it might ultimately lead to a 
deinstitutionalization of the MSI norm. This may occur if the meaning of the institution and 
its practices are not aligned (Zilber, 2002). Thus, if followers interested in pulling down the 
standard succeed in their endeavor, the institutionalized meaning of the MSI norm and its 
practices are no longer aligned.v Furthermore, if outside stakeholders realize this downward 
movement of the standard, they will raise skepticism and are likely to withdraw given 
legitimacy as they would not consider the soft law MSI norm as robust i.e. it is not anymore 
what it was set out to be (Nolan, 2013). Thus, while both the MSI secretariat and parts of the 
pioneering company members (raising rival’s costs) may wish to hold onto a certain 
minimum standard, their push towards an increase in membership may lead to the exact 
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opposite. Rather then using soft law to force others to comply with a standard, those that were 
forced push back by watering down the standards. 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, we addressed the actor and institutional dynamics within MSIs aimed at 
self-regulation. Based on the insights of club theory and institutional theory, we developed a 
stage model that depicts the various influences an MSI faces. Specifically, we conceptualized 
how the interaction between the interests of the different internal stakeholders – such as the 
MSI secretariat, reputation-securing companies, or civil society organizations – with external 
stakeholders – such as non-participating civil society organization, the public, or non-
participating companies – influences the type of MSI norm that emerges and how changes in 
these interactions may yield changes in the MSI norm. 
Based on our conceptualizations, we conjecture that in certain scenarios, the success 
of an MSI might have ambivalent follow-up effects. The more successful the MSI becomes in 
terms of visibility, of institutionalization, and of enlarging its membership base, the more 
institutional dynamics may change the self-selection effects and thus the composition of MSI 
business members. This may, though need not, render it more difficult to secure the quality of 
the MSI norm. When the pull toward improving the quality of self-regulation comes into 
conflict with the push toward watering down self-regulation, negative consequences, 
including (1) deadlock, (2) abuse, and (3) loss of legitimacy, can ensue. 
A deadlock (1) will paralyze the MSI. The increasing difficulty of consensus may lead 
to a complete loss of effective decision-making and enforcement. Another possibility is abuse 
(2) of the MSI by members that shirk on its reputation. In the extreme, companies might even 
use their nominal participation in the MSI to ward off other forms of hard law legislation. As 
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a consequence of such developments, the MSI ultimately runs the risk of losing its legitimacy 
(3). 
To overcome these and other difficulties so as to reach their potential for addressing 
urgent societal challenges (Bäckstrand, 2006; O’Rourke, 2006; Roloff, 2008a, 2008c), MSIs 
and its members need to manage the development process. To begin with, pioneer members 
need to be clearly aware of their different interests to negotiate a potentially robust norm. 
Moreover, once the pioneers agreed on a MSI norm, they should also consider how to 
safeguard this norm. For this purpose, there are multiple possibilities. For instance, the MSI 
could introduce screening mechanisms prior to gaining membership, apply monitoring during 
membership, or allow for sanctioning such as cancelling membership if members do not 
comply.  
Furthermore, as research indicates, new actors (the MSI) need to create shared 
meaning to gain cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994) for their work. For this purpose, 
rather than using quantitative information such as the number of members, MSI could 
consider using qualitative information for effective story-telling. According to Kaplan (1986), 
stories are often able to bridge between stakeholders and to bring forth information and 
insight that would otherwise not be obtainable or understood. Moreover, we conjecture that 
by telling stories rather than stating pure numbers, the MSI will also avoid being measured 
against only numbers but rather also against qualitative impact. In addition, this story-telling 
may also help to create a form of shared identity within the MSI. Such identity creation might 
then reduce the risk of organizational capture.  
These recommendations can be condensed into three general insights. (1) MSIs will 
benefit from a clear awareness of the potential tradeoffs and tensions that can occur with a 
growth in membership. (2) To avoid conflict that can lead to dysfunction or even non-
function, MSIs need to manage the governance of their development by, among other things, 
Actor and Institutional Dynamics in the Development of MSIs 
 42 
defining and/or designing success indicators, appropriate admission procedures, and decision-
making structures. (3) Throughout the whole process of its development and lifecycle, the 
MSI should pay special attention to its communication strategy, since appropriate, well-
reasoned communication can be the key to securing transparency and, consequently, 
legitimacy. 
As a future research avenue, scholarship could enhance our process framework by 
generating insights into mediating and moderating factors to better understand its boundary 
conditions. Since we focused our framework on the interactions within and with the MSI as 
the unit of analysis, we believe that shifting the unit of analysis to the various stakeholder 
groups would greatly benefit the further advancing of our proposed stage model. By so doing, 
research might be able to build a more complete picture of the mechanisms related to MSI 
conflicts and processes. Furthermore, future research on the political role of the firm, 
particularly on self-regulation efforts, may benefit from including MSI secretariats into their 
conceptual and empirical work as they are so far neglected. To this end, a large-N exploratory 
study amongst various types of self-regulation MSIs might help to generate insights into the 
various actor and institutional dynamics as well as into their contingencies.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: The conceptual complementarity of club and institutional theory  
 Club Theory Institutional 
Theory 
  
accounts for   
Individual agency: why individual actors have an interest to 
create or join an MSI 
✔ (✔) 
Diversity and potential conflict of interests: 
explaining shirking and free-riding 
✔ ✖ 
Increasing group size fostering internal conflicts of interests ✔ ✖ 
Reputation as a self-produced club good ✔ ✖ 
Legitimacy as depending on fulfilling external expectations ✖ ✔ 
Institutional dynamics through institutionalization processes 
that change external expectations 
✖ ✔ 
Isomorphic mechanisms that make companies adopt similar 
behavior 
✖ ✔ 
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Table 2: Company participation in EITI 




9 12 24 28 37 46 56 67 80 
New Members 
∆ n    4 9 9       10                 11                23  
       Source: Internet Archive (2013b) 
Table 3: Overview of MSIs used for illustrative purposes 
Characteristic EITI UNGC FSC 
Year established 2002 1999 1990 
Initiator(s) UK Prime Minister 
Tony Blair 
UN General Secretary 
Kofi-Anan 
WWF plus timber 




Lack of transparency 
about taxes and other 
payments made by 
extractive companies 
and their use by local 
governments  
Need for more responsible 
behavior of businesses in 
the areas of human rights, 
labor standards and anti-
corruption  
Decreasing forests 
as a problem both 
for the Earth’s 
ecosystem as well 
as for companies 
which use timber as 
resource 
Mechanisms Countries publish 
what they receive 
Companies (whether 
they are supporting 
EITI or not) need to 
report what they pay 
to governments in 
“compliant” 
countries1 
Companies join and pledge 
their compliance to the 10 
principles 
Companies must go 
through certification 







to report what they 
pay to governments 
on a single aspect) 








Lenient standards (ten 
principles in principle 
require compliance in 
multiple areas, however in 
practice only reporting is 
required as output)  
Medium sword (no third-




companies will at least 




















Berliner & Prakash (2012); 
Brinkmann-Braun & Pies 
(2007); Kell (2012); Perez-
Batres, Miller & Pisani 
(2011); Rasche & Gilbert 
(2012) Rasche, Waddock 
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& MacIntosh (2012); Sethi 
& Schepers (2013) 
 
 
1Schuler (2012: 9)  
2based on Potoski & Prakash (2009: 29)  
3 Schuler (2012: 8)  
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At the 2002 World Summit of Sustainable development in Johannesburg (South 
Africa), UK Prime Minister Tony Blair initiated the Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative (EITI). Its main purpose is to tackle the issue of payments to governments in the 
extractive industries that is mining, oil, and gas. In these industries, companies usually pay 
local governments in order to obtain mining rights. In many developing nations, however, this 
money often vanishes within governments and is not used for national requirements such as 
education or health. Against this background, EITI uses a mechanism in which countries 
openly declare what amounts of royalties and other payments they received. Through these 
mechanisms, local and global civil society actors have a means to ask how the respective 
amounts have been spent. Therefore, transparency about the amounts and its use is increased.  
The United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) was brought forward in 1999 by then 
UN general secretary Kofi-Annan. The initiative was officially launched in 2000. Originally, 
the UNGC started with 9 principles for responsible business conduct with regard to human 
rights, labor standards, and the environment. Later, anti-corruption was included as the tenth 
principle. Companies can join the UNGC and pledge their compliance to these ten principals. 
Members are then expected to publicly report on their progress. If they fail to do that, the 
UNGC delists these non-compliant members for a year after which they can join again.  
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is a certification scheme developed by the 
Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) and companies that use or trade timber. Together, these 
actors discussed how the world’s forest could be used as resources for timber products while 
at the same time protecting them as key elements of the world’s ecosystem. The first FSC 
meetings took place in 1990 while the first certificates where issued in 1993. Companies can 
only become FSC members if they fully comply with the principles of the MSI. Only after the 
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certification process is completed, companies may refer to themselves as FSC members. As 
the certification frequently needs renewal, companies can loose their membership if they fail 
to comply with the required principles during recertification.  
---------------------------------------- 








                                                
i Other terms include new governance (Pies, Beckmann, & Hielscher, 2011; Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011), global public policy networks (Witte, Benner, & Streck, 2005), transnational 
private regulation (Bartley, 2007; Graz & Nölke, 2008), multi-sector networks (Bäckstrand, 
2006; Roloff, 2008b), and stewardship councils, (Baccaro & Mele, 2011; L. Fransen, 2011; 
Gugerty, Sidel, & Bies, 2010). 
ii Note that we thus exclude MSIs that were practically mandated by for example the 
state or that emerged because of short-term pressures in the face of an acute crisis or scandal, 
such as the The Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety after the 2013 catastrophe 
when a major textile factory collapsed and left more than 1100 workers dead. 
iii We consider the difference between legitimacy and reputation to be the following: 
Reputation refers to what the company “stands for” in the eyes of others, while legitimacy 
only results if the company additionally gains social acceptance by fulfilling prevailing norms 
of appropriate behavior. To illustrate, a company might build up a reputation for offering 
eccentric design without gaining substantial legitimacy if there are no social norms that 
expect companies to do so. 
iv “Regulatory capture” occurs when regulatory agencies created to serve the public 
interest are “captured” by the very actors, such as firms, they are supposed to regulate. As a 
result, the “captured” agency fails to serve its public purpose. In political economy, regulatory 
capture usually refers to government agencies, thus describing a problem that can arise in 
conventional nation-state governance. We suggest that the idea of “regulatory capture” can be 
usefully transferred to the field of new governance and self-regulation. For the original idea of 
regulatory capture, see Laffont and Tirole (1991) and Levine and Forrence (1990).  
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v  Similarly, this may also occur if more and more members are not actually 
implementing standards.  
 
